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In the current climate of service reorganisation and sensitivity surrounding cost, it is clear that 
commissioners and providers in the health and social care economy are striving to strengthen 
integrated care as a means of improving quality and reducing costs (Curry and Ham 2010; Ham and 
Walsh 2013). Across England, health and social care systems are having to confront many pressures. 
For example, most of the funding is tied up in acute and long term social care, current NHS contracts 
are widely regarded as insufficient for the transformation agenda with block contracts stifling 
innovation, and Payment by Results does not incentivise the reduction in admissions or social care 
changes but in fact acts as a perverse incentive (Curry et al 2011). In addition, Advanced Assistive 
Technology should be embedded within integrated care but is often peripheral. 
As a consequence, commissioners must rapidly consider commissioning and contracting 
arrangements to enable them to drive forward service integration that is innovative, sustainable and 
transferable. Recently, there has also been support from NHS England Chief Executive Simon Stevens 
for promoting more flexible approaches to commissioning and contracting, strongly suggesting that 
CCGs could explore alternative approaches. These ideas have become more formalised in NHS 
England’s Five Year Forward View, with Multi-Specialty Community Providers (MCPs) and Primary 
and Acute Care Systems (PACS) eventually evolving to hold a delegated budget for the health and 
care of whole populations (NHS England 2014). These new integrated care models require strong 
relationships and trust between the different organisations and professionals delivering care, which 
should be underpinned by sound contracting mechanisms that have relational concepts embedded 
within them. However, there is currently scanty evidence on contracting approaches that would 
have a good fit with the transformation agenda, particularly concerning how agencies can work 
towards joint outcomes. 
This paper presents the findings of an international literature review of contracting approaches, 
models and designs, with the aim of critically analysing their suitability to the integrated health and 
social care agenda. An important feature of this was to capitalise on learning from agencies and 
industries external to our health and social care systems and to identify in particular evidence of 
effectiveness and what could be usefully be transposed. The approach and search strategy of the 
literature review can be found as an appendix.  
 
Findings 
While a total of eight models were identified, this literature review will focus on the first four listed 
given their growing prominence in current commentary, namely a) Accountable Care Organisations, 
b) Alliance Contracting Model, c) Lead Provider/Prime Contractor Model and d) Outcomes-Based 



































As intimated in the search steps, the literature review revealed some contrasting findings with 
respect to the nature and origin of data sources. For all four models, there is a concentration of 
activity over the last two to three years, which reflects the interest and need for information. Some 
difference between the models were however evident. With regard to ACOs, there was considerable 
concentrated published debate over a two year period and high level political and operational 
commentary in reputable journals. With the Alliance model, the larger numbers of articles resulted 
from its longer history and wider use outside of health and social care, although more current 
debate and description was gathered through journalistic sources and websites. The Lead Provider 
and Outcomes-Based Contracting approaches shared some similarity in that there were a few 
notable commentators (eg King’s Fund, Nuffield Trust) leading the field through informative 
publications and for Lead Provider, dedicated websites provided examples. For Outcomes-Based 
Contracting, the latest developments were sourced through news items and direct examples of use 
found opportunistically through their availability on the internet. Of note is the fact that evidence for 
this review was almost entirely sourced from healthcare journals or related websites (medical, public 
health, management) with no primary social care commentary apparent in the debates. 
 
a) Accountable Care Organisations  
Definition and Purpose:  Accountable care organisations (ACOs) were proposed in the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), signed into USA law in 2010, as a measure to slow rising healthcare costs and 
improve quality in the traditional Medicare programme. ACOs are groups of primary and secondary 
care physicians, and other health care providers, potentially including hospitals, who will work 
together to avoid duplication of services (Fisher & McClellan 2011), so there is a strong emphasis on 
integrated care. The goals of ACOs are to align care, reduce costs, and increase quality of care 
primarily through primary care (Bennett 2012) with the emergence of a coherent vision for chronic 
disease prevention and population health (Corbett & Kappagoda 2013). While ACOs have been 
defined and interpreted differently by various leaders in the field, an ACO has been generally 
defined as "a local network of providers that can manage the full continuum of care for all patients 
within their provider network" (Ronning 2010, 47). The ACA also introduces the creation of the 
Shared Savings Program (SSP) for Medicare reimbursement, which is the incentive programme tied 
to the ACOs. ACOs may be an effective way to begin reforming the US healthcare system because 
they address both provider payment and delivery system reform (Bennett 2012). 
Characteristics: ACOs are expected to coordinate care among health providers to produce 
streamlined services.  Providers are held accountable for achieving measured quality improvements 
while also reducing the rate of spending growth (McCellan 2010). A driving force to encourage this 
adoption is payment reform, which aims to gradually shift the focus from a fee-for-service system 
with shared savings to a more capitated payment system and pay for performance. To ensure these 
savings are not achieved by reducing needed services, the amount of savings returned to physician 
groups is affected by the quality of care provided by the group, and there is public reporting of the 
quality and costs of care (Bernstein 2013). ACOs have at their roots a ‘value-based health care’ 



































supplier and should be measured by outputs. As efficiencies are important, the objective becomes to 
ensure patient health outcomes relative to the total cost.  
ACOs must have a leadership committed to improving value for their patients, the skills and 
infrastructure necessary to manage the financial risk of this new model, an information technology 
system capable of processing internal and external data, and the ability to deliver key information to 
providers and patients (Miller 2011).  These goals are consistent with the “triple aim” of improving 
the care of an individual patient, improving the care of the overall population, and reducing health 
care expenditures (Berwick et al 2008). 
Because of the population health focus, the most innovative ACOs will pursue a range of nonclinical 
interventions that address social norms at an individual and population level, both because these 
interventions align with their mission and because they are a cost-effective way to implement 
prevention (Corbett & Kappagoda 2013). Under the ACA, any of the following arrangements may 
qualify as an ACO (CMS 2011); professionals in group practice arrangements; networks of individual 
practices of professionals; partnerships or joint venture arrangements between professionals and 
hospitals; hospitals employing professionals; other groups of providers and suppliers deemed 
appropriate. ACOs must report on the 33 quality metrics to participate. These measures are divided 
into four health domains: patient/caregiver experience; care coordination/patient safety; preventive 
care; and at-risk population. ACO's performance will be collected using a variety of tools, which 
could include patient surveys, electronic health records, and claims. 
Applications: This is largely an initiative embedded within USA health care systems although there 
are comparisons being made with the Five Year Forward View (NHS England 2014). There are a 
number of articles emerging describing early implementation models and applications, but this is 
largely a period of transition for the US healthcare system with few concrete examples of its full 
application and evaluation.  
Shortell et al (2014a) give an account of a taxonomy of ACOs to describe and understand early ACO 
development and to provide a basis for technical assistance and future evaluation of performance. 
They report a three-cluster solution from 173 organisations: larger, integrated systems that offer a 
broad scope of services and frequently include one or more post-acute facilities; smaller, physician-
led practices, centred in primary care, and that possess a relatively high degree of physician 
performance management; and moderately sized, joint hospital–physician and coalition-led groups 
that offer a moderately broad scope of services with some involvement of post-acute facilities.  
A further study by the same authors (Shortell et al 2014b) conducted a National survey of 1,183 
physician practices to investigate physician-practice involvement in ACOs between 2012 and 2013. 
23.7 percent of reported joining an ACO; 15.7 percent were planning to become involved within the 
next 12 months but the majority (60.6) percent reported no involvement and no plans to become 
involved. Physician practices that are currently participating in ACOs appear to be relatively large, or 
to be members of an Independent Practice Association (IPA) or Physician hospital Organisation 
(PHO), are less likely to be hospital owned and are more likely to use more care management 



































clinic focusing on multi-speciality medical practice, and states that a values-driven culture of 
teamwork is largely responsible for its success. 
Benefits/Success Factors: As yet there is no evidence of effectiveness but Song et al (2012) provided 
some evidence in favour of this approach, analysing changes in spending and quality associated with 
an ACO-type quality contract and found that the rate of increase in spending slowed compared to 
control groups. Savings were accounted for by lower prices achieved through shifting procedures, 
imaging, and tests to facilities with lower fees, as well as reduced use among some groups. 
Quality of care also improved compared to control organisations, with chronic care management, 
adult preventive care, and paediatric care within the contracting groups improving more.  
Aside from this, a number of ‘aspirational’ benefits have been put forward. As the basis for any ACO 
is to provide effective primary care, improving access to primary care (through use of e-mail, 
telephone support, physician extenders) and coordinating the care of patients with complex illness is 
hoped to lead to fewer preventable emergency department visits, hospitalisations, and readmissions 
(Bernstein 2013). 
ACOs can provide some benefits to participating physicians. One of the key benefits may be through 
their information technology systems. Health information exchange can assure that all providers 
across a community have access to the same patient information to allow better care coordination. 
In addition, delivering timely patient information to front-line personnel may decrease unnecessary 
testing and improve chronic disease management (Bernstein 2013). Patient portal and personal 
health records may lead to increased patient engagement in their own care and educational 
opportunities (Bernstein 2012).  
Use of Incentives: The Shared Savings Program (SSP) for Medicare reimbursement is the incentive 
programme tied to the ACOs to promote their formation and use, and is completely voluntary.  
If an ACO meets certain quality metrics and reduces health care spending to levels below projected 
costs, it shares the savings with the insurers. ACOs have the potential to align many different 
incentives in order to improve health system quality and reduce health care costs across 
populations. Because this model incentivises health systems to maintain the health of large patient 
populations rather than provide expensive treatments to individuals, institutions have a reason to 
look at all the factors that might negatively affect patients’ health status, including the social 
determinants of health. They also have incentives to promote healthy choices to their patient 
population, their employees, and the communities they serve, as those choices reinforce the 
preventive orientation of the health care delivered within an ACO. The most innovative ACOs will 
pursue a range of nonclinical interventions that address social norms at an individual and population 
level, both because these interventions align with their mission and because they are a cost-effective 
way to implement prevention (Corbett & Kappagoda 2013).  
It is not clear that ACOs can do much about changing incentives to physicians to lower costs. There is 
no doubt that financial incentives can increase the alignment of physician behaviour and the 



































Champion 2011).  The question is whether the financial incentives inherent in the ACO program are 
significant enough to have any impact on physician behaviour. 
Critique: According to Reynolds and Roble (2011) the most challenging aspect of creating an ACO is 
the start-up cost. Their American Hospital Association study estimated that implementation will be 
much more expensive than indicated and many observers are concerned that the implementation 
costs will not be worth the potential savings. In addition, Bennet (2012) notes that many providers 
believe the incentives to participate in ACOs and Medicare's SSP are too difficult to attain and too 
operationally burdensome to seek. In a survey of its members, the American Medical Association 
reported that 93 percent would not participate in an ACO (Wall Street Journal 2011).  
Correia (2011) comments on the quality metrics; their mandatory collection, which will have to be 
conducted at least partially by the ACO, could pose a significant cost to hospitals. Alongside the 
quality indicators and other competencies that ACOs have to measure and reach, there are a vast 
number of legal requirements, ‘antitrust’ standards, and approval procedures (such as for marketing 
material to patients) that will put governing and approval agencies as well as potential ACOs under 
considerable bureaucratic pressure and create delays. Furthermore, he adds that complying to 
arrangements for patient empowerment and patient centredness will be challenging as these terms 
are not self-defining and there are a wide variety of approaches to achieving these goals, depending 
on how they are defined. Correia warns that an ACO that offers a narrow range of services will find it 
difficult to steer its patients toward efficient ways of receiving care, because the statute guarantees 
patients the right to go to any provider. It makes it impossible to ensure that patients go to doctors 
or institutions that use evidence-based treatment protocols, meet minimum quality standards, or 
follow any of the requirements imposed on the ACO to provide high-quality, low-cost care. 
Press et al (2012) have an additional concerns regarding implementation. While structure and 
incentives may facilitate the delivery of coordinated care, they will not necessarily ensure that care 
coordination is done well. For that, physicians and other healthcare providers within ACOs must 
possess and utilize specific skills, particularly in the areas of collaboration, communication, and 
teamwork.  
As ACOs are being rolled out, other commentators such as Stenson and Thompson (2013) describe 
the potential land mines in the transition to a new paradigm of value-based health care and the 
principles sponsors should consider in understanding and integrating ACOs into their 
health care benefits strategy. In addition, Decamp et al (2014) explored the ethical challenges as no 
framework exists to support decision-making in this area. The authors reveal dilemmas associated 
with the fair resource allocation, design of professional financial incentives, threats to professional 
autonomy, and conflicted responsibility for patients versus ACOs. Lewis et al (2012) add another 
concern relating to vulnerable population groups such as the clinically at-risk and the socially 
disadvantaged, who may not be incorporated into a new model that is aimed at reducing costs while 
improving the quality of care. 
 



































Definition and Purpose: The literature on alliances dates back to the 80’s. When defining an alliance, 
virtually all researchers use terms such as cooperation, collaboration, value creation, or similar ones 
designed to convey that alliances involve a closer and more interdependent relationship than 
standard supplier transactions (Bruner & Spekman 1998; Zoller 1999; Mayer & Treece 2008). The 
following statement is typical: “Cooperation and collaboration distinguish the strategic alliance from 
an ordinary intercorporate transaction” (BenDaniel et al., 2002, p. 363).  
An alliance contract is one contract between the owner, financier or commissioner and an alliance of 
parties who deliver the project or service. There is a risk share across all parties and collective 
ownership of opportunities and responsibilities associated with delivery of the whole project or 
service. An alliance contract is a way of working that focuses on relationships and creates an 
environment of trust, collaboration and innovation. It is seen as ideal for integrated care because it 
drives collaboration between all parties. Contracts are not separated from improvement and 
transformation initiatives, they are an integral part of them. http://lhalliances.org.uk/ 
Regarding their purpose, agencies need to form alliances in order to address complex business 
challenges. Alliances can complement organisations’ core competencies and allow them to jointly 
answer problems that a client or market has identified and no single entity can serve (Augustine & 
Cooper 2009). In addition, alliances serve to gain production efficiencies and the resultant lower 
costs; expedite access to technology, markets, and/or customers; promote organisational learning; 
expand strategic competencies; launch a strategic response to a much larger, or more nimble, 
competitor (Lorange and Roos 1993; Bruner & Spekman 1998). 
Characteristics: Augustine & Cooper (2009) identify certain types of alliances, occurring between 
two or more firms:  
promotional alliances create brand awareness in a market; 
operational alliances are used if there is a need to work closely together to improve the operational 
efficiency of a company or market; 
relationship alliances function to mitigate risk and expand new markets for firms that are relatively 
equal in size;  
strategic alliances are formed to create joint ventures wherein two firms complement each other’s 
strengths, securing, maintaining or enhancing a company’s competitive advantage. 
Relational aspects relating to trust, loyalty and commitment for the long term are important (de 
Jong & Klein Woolthuis 2008). In addition, contracts feature highly in the alliance discourse. Alliance 
contracting is defined as an agreement between parties to work cooperatively to achieve agreed 
outcomes on the basis of sharing risks and rewards (Gallagher & Hutchinson 2003). Mayer & Treece 
(2008) among others emphasise that contracts are central parts of an alliance as they both provide a 
means for enforcement and define the roles and responsibilities of each party. Due to the broader 
scope of the relationship, alliance contracts tend to have a longer duration, involve more intricate 
administrative structures and dispute resolution mechanisms, and specify the exchange of much 
more firm-specific information, technical knowledge and capabilities. 
Applications: Alliances in their different forms are found in a wide range of organisations and 



































electronic industries). Firms initiate alliances in order to offer a new product or service or address 
goals relating to revenue growth, competition, and/or market share (Clifton & Duffield 2006; 
Augustine & Cooper 2009). Alliance activity is reported largely in the USA and Asian economies. 
Within the NHS, Alliance contracting is a relatively new concept to healthcare procurement and 
there is growing discussion and activity regarding implementation (Addicott 2014), but no full and 
evaluated application so far. It is one of the models of innovative contracting that the NHS 
Commissioning Board proposes to enable through its NHS Contract 13/14.  
Four stages have been put forward to building an alliance contract: 
1. Commissioner readiness: leadership and capability, clarity on service and outline contract, 
co-designed outcomes; 
2. Alignment: choosing the right partners, aligning business and personal drivers, commitment 
to collaboration, openness and innovation; 
3. Finalisation of [openly negotiated and collectively agreed] contract: principles for 
behaviours, performance and commercial framework, governance roles, implementation 
plan, target costs; 
4. Launch: staff information sessions, early meetings of leadership teams, continued support. 
(http://lhalliances.org.uk/) 
Addicott (2014) describes a number of on-going initiatives in the NHS including integrated 
personalised support services in Lambeth, and older people’s services in Salford. 
Benefits/Success Factors: Alliances have been empirically shown to be effective mechanisms for 
transferring knowledge, spreading risk (Hennart, 1988), and learning (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). The 
financial return provided by alliance relationships, as an indicator of goal-based determinants, was 
found to be the most important factor related to outcome quality (Weaver & Dickson 1998). 
Addicott’s (2014) review of on-going NHS alliance models suggests that benefits include the strong 
incentives to collaborate, limiting the dominance of a single organisation, strengthening 
relationships between commissioners and providers, and retaining the active involvement of 
commissioners. Most of the literature however reports on process factors that will support an 
alliance, revealed through ‘lessons learned’ of their implementation. There is very little that could 
provide an evidence-base of effectiveness. 
These supportive process factors start with the importance of securing good management 
arrangements, which is seen as vital, such as having departments dedicated to alliance management 
(Kale et al., 2000). In addition, it is important to clarify roles and responsibilities, consider conflicts of 
interest, anticipate and manage comparisons between alliances. Alliances must be continuously 
evaluated with regular reporting on performance – this includes the quality of individual alliances 
and their respective alliance portfolios (Augustine & Cooper 2009). Devlin & Bleackley (1988) state 
that a rigorous search for the right alliance partner must be made to ensure compatibility over a 
long period. There must be clear lines of accountability and responsibility and ways of establishing 
information retrieval processes. Alliances must bring sufficient resources to the alliance from the 
onset and recruit or ‘fast track’ high quality staff, using it as a career enhancing opportunity. It is also 



































compatible in terms of ‘softer issues,’ they can coordinate more easily. This refers to the 
organisations’ cultures. Corporate culture affects many critical aspects of management and 
operations, such as how deadlines are perceived, decisions are made, and clients are treated (Kale et 
al 2002). In complex alliances that cross national boundaries longer, rather than shorter, periods of 
time might be needed to establish a web of interpersonal ties among key managers, to build a more 
accepting environment for cultural differences, and to nurture the trust and commitment that are 
essential alliance ingredients (Bruner & Spekman 1998). 
When it comes to governance arrangements, relational embeddedness, based on personal ties, and 
structural embeddedness, based on ownership ties, can support the employment of formal 
governance mechanisms. Attention must be paid to the moderating role of network embeddedness 
in diminishing the relationship between transaction hazards and formal governance mechanisms (Lin 
et al 2011). 
Use of Incentives: Mayer & Treece (2008), studying the jet engine industry, report that the payment 
mechanisms in these contracts are structured so as to spread risk and create strong incentives that 
link each party to the success of the overall engine development program. This arrangement serves 
to align incentives for the parties as the in the alliance everyone is paid at the same time. They also 
share the risk of customer default. 
Critique: Augustine & Cooper (2008) report a high failure rate of organisations in alliances, largely 
due to the fact that competition between alliance partners jeopardises the alliance. Alliance 
partnerships differ in the amount of pressure the firms feel to cooperate versus compete. These 
competitive forces are affected by contracts existing between the parties, the amount of product 
and service overlap, as well as the amount of trust in the relationship. In addition, other challenges 
include competing interests within firm leadership, negotiation of alliance agreements, and alliance 
promotion. 
Added to this, the attributes of individual firms, partnerships, or networks of alliance relationships 
can hamper alliance performance. The performance of an alliance can be affected by the larger 
network of relationships in which the alliance is embedded. If a company has multiple alliances, 
these alliances may compete with one another if they are formed to fulfil the same purpose 
(Augustine & Cooper 2008). 
Central to alliances is trust, cooperation and collaboration, however mistrust of alliance partners can 
occur through suspicions of power-seeking through knowledge sharing. Alliances can breed 
misalignment of mission, ideals, economics and culture. As a result they are formed with difficulty, 
and are easily strained. As conditions change, the alliance must adapt (Bruner & Spekman 1998). 
When it comes to alliance contracts, they are seen as an imperfect safeguard against opportunistic 
behaviour because the parties cannot foresee all possible contingencies which makes all contracts 
incomplete. The ambiguity in how alliances are defined makes them difficult to study because the 




































c) Lead Provider/Prime Contractor Model 
Definition and Purpose: This model is concerned with service integration and transformation and is 
seen as a vehicle to tackle the long-standing problems with integration in the past. It aims to deliver 
genuinely integrated care, based around both the needs of patient groups and individual patients. It 
will also have to respond to powerful incentives to keep patients at home and out of hospital. An 
additional aim is to prevent commissioners having many different contracts with several providers 
(Corrigan & Laitner 2012; Corrigan 2013; Addicott 2014; Flynn et al 2014).  
In this model: 
• one provider is given the responsibility through a contract for subcontracting to other providers 
for the various aspects of care to both deliver care and also to ensure all different aspects of 
care are fully integrated, bringing together the previously episodic providers of care into a single 
pathway;  
• commissioners will commission Programmes of Care via an Accountable Lead Provider. The 
power needed to provide accountable integrated care can only be delivered from a provider 
within the pathway of care, ideally in the centre of the pathway between primary care and 
hospital inpatient care;  
• an outcome based contract with the Accountable Lead Provider will be set up and through this 
contract clinical and financial incentives will be aligned in the Lead Provider’s management of 
the programme.  
• the Lead Provider will support primary care in its part of the pathway whilst at the same time 
managing unwarranted variation in primary care referrals. They will also help manage the 
gateway into hospital based in patient care. 
The other major driver towards this form of delivery is purported to be the economic imperative to 
deliver significantly better health care outcomes for the same resource. Existing provision of 
integrated care is rarely achieving this outcome. This will need contracts across different parts of the 
system rather than contracts with individual organisations only. The major efficiency improvements 
will come from better management of the interfaces across the care pathway (Corrigan & Laitner 
2012). 
The literature reveals the use of alternative different terms for similar roles and models. Addicott 
(2014) from a King’s Fund perspective for example refers to a prime contractor model, where the 
CCG contracts with a single organisation (or consortium) which then takes responsibility for the day-
to-day management of other providers that deliver care within the contracted scope or pathway. 
Addicott also describes a significant variation on the prime contractor model - the prime provider 
model - that stipulates that the contracted organisation also provides services directly. In addition 
there are accountable prime provider, active integrator, and non-lead provider references which all 
appear to be variations on the above (eg O’Flynn et al 2014).   
Characteristics: Authors such as Addicott (2014) have attempted to build typologies of the above 
named models that clearly describe their characteristics and suitability to different contexts. 
However, it is apparent that there is no clear demarcation between these named models and how 
they are being used in practice; many of the terms are used interchangeably. In fact, Addicott 



































greater value in determining how the principles or ambitions that underpin the desired 
transformation can in general be built into the terms of a contract. 
Corrigan & Laitner (2012) provide an initial outline of certain principles of ‘lead providers’: 
• Commissioners let a contract for an Accountable Integrated Programme of Care (AIPC), each 
containing a number of related pathways, to a single organisation that will then both provide 
specialist ambulatory care whilst also integrating existing and other providers into a programme 
of care for a defined patient group.  
• Lead providers will develop fully integrated care using different contract mechanisms that can 
take on programme risk and accountability. This will need different forms of contract pricing and 
much less pathway micro-management. The model will need a budget that is based around the 
existing budget for a total programme of care and not just the reproduction of episodes.  
• The Lead Provider model provides strong power for the integrator, since they have both the 
clinical and financial accountability (and budget) for the whole programme of care and can 
create the new integrated incentives that will make integrated care possible. 
• The model will retain most of the existing providers of the different aspects of health and social 
care in the new integrated patient pathways (eg GPs, community nurses, A&E staff, social care 
staff). Hospital outpatients are likely to move over time to a community based, ambulatory, 
specialist, multidisciplinary model.  
• The Lead Provider may wish to create some form of Joint Venture between provider partners 
such as social care, third sector organisations and independent providers, or it may wish to have 
only lead provider/subcontractor relationship.  
• The model will need a budget that is based around the existing budget for a total programme of 
care and not just the reproduction of episodes. This model is connected to the Year of Care tariff 
(Year of Care 2011), where Implementer sites are working out the costs of a year of care for a 
long-term condition patient. 
 
Applications: Although it has been used in industry and education for a number of years (eg 
Leicester Youth and Community services, lead provider service model for education 2001 
http://politics.leics.gov.uk/mgConvert2PDF.aspx?ID=1524), this is a new model in health and social 
care provision and as yet has not been established in the UK. In Australia this approach is more 
established. Here, the government contracts with a lead or prime provider and the models tend to 
be locally based, partnership-type approaches delivering services to a specific client group, initiated 
by community or not-for-profit organisations rather than being driven by government (O’Flynn et al 
2014).  In the UK there are some examples of strategies, plans in progress and intentions of how it 
will be used emerging. These range from small local initiatives to region-wide intentions. An 
outcomes-based commissioning approach is strongly linked with this model.  
QIPP Right Care has been developing significant stakeholder interest in the Lead Provider model, 
involving Royal Colleges, National Clinical Directors, Clinical Commissioners and several patient 
groups. (www.rightcare.nhs.uk) and have some case studies that are being monitored, with variation 
in how the ‘lead provider’ role is not only named but operationalised. This includes integrated GP-



































pain in Somerset (Corrigan et al 2012), and for prime contractor models, a case study of an 
integrating pathway hub in Pennine MSK Partnership (Corrigan et al 2012) and cancer and end-of-life 
care services in Staffordshire (Addicott 2014). 
Typically, case studies are reporting ‘lessons learned’ as the models are rolled out. In the case of the 
Bexley example for instance, it became clear that the integrator must be a strong individual and 
have a high level of formal contractual power and the project benefitted from a GP champion who 
saw their role as developing their colleagues, and healthcare professionals who recognised the need 
to create a new service. 
Benefits/Success Factors: There is no evidence of effectiveness, but there are suggestions of factors 
that need to be considered or in place when implementing this model. Corrigan & Laitner (2012) 
assert that the model is a new, sustainable approach to commissioning care and also a mechanism 
to transform pathways of care in terms of quality and productivity.  The details of how this can be 
operationalised will be largely left to the new implementers of this model, however some ‘how to’ 
indicators can be extracted from their report, such as framing the contract at the right level of 
patient need, and ensuring with knowledge transfer that there is a commonality of language and 
meaning from each of the contractors in the pathway. Addicott (2014) suggests that prime 
contractor models are simple for commissioners to manage, enable pathway management and shift 
clinical accountability onto integrator and providers. With respect to the prime provider model, she 
outlines the strengths as having increased direct control over provision across a pathway, enabling 
money to move within the pathway, and a clear governance arrangement through 
contractual/subcontractual mechanisms. O’Flynn et al (2014) see the perceived benefits of prime 
provider models for government including greater coordination of local specialist providers, reducing 
administrative costs and enhancing opportunities for innovative service delivery resulting from 
economies of scale. 
‘Bearing Point’ has an interactive forum focused on how to commission a lead provider pathway, 
bringing together ‘thought-leadership’, looking at managing risks and building on lessons learnt. The 
website states there are distinct elements to developing such a model such as pre-qualification 
analysis of the contract process, stakeholder engagement, scoping key clinical specifications and 
market shaping through analysing provider organisations and networks.    
Use of Incentives: Corrigan & Laitner (2012) describe a new set of systematic and rigorous incentives 
that need to be developed to overcome the existing incentives, cultural and organisational barriers 
that have created the fragmented professional care in the first place. The main difference in the 
Lead Provider model compared with other models is that different aspects of care will be 
incentivised by the lead provider to work together into a coherent patient pathway, making clear 
that each aspect of the work will be incomplete unless integration with each other takes place. This 
provides the lead provider (with its subcontractors) the ability to construct an overall pathway of 
care with incentives that provide the commissioner with the outcomes that they want. The Lead 
Provider will take overall leadership and accountability for the commission, then sub contract the 
aspects of care to different providers and incentivise those providers to drive towards that desired 




































Critique: It has proved difficult within the NHS to understand who will be actually carrying out the 
integrator role. Corrigan (2013) states that one major challenge will be to decide which organisation 
will be the lead provider. The existing NHS institutional framework consists of large institutions that 
provide secondary and tertiary care and mainly very small institutions that provide primary care. 
Within primary care, some Mental Health Trust may be of sufficient capacity, and if there was a large 
federation of GPs to provide primary care services, they may be able to take on the risk. But in most 
parts of the country organisations in primary care lack the size to take this difficult task on. 
In Australia where this model is more established, O’Flynn et al (2014) describe the challenges for 
government as the hollowing out of capabilities and provider or market failure. In addition, the 
authors note that prime providers themselves are faced with challenges relating to managing 
potential risks and liabilities as well as contract and performance management. 
Within UK commentary, Corrigan (2013) notes that the lead provider model is a challenge because 
the contract is for health care outcomes that are essentially outside the control of the hospital, and 
the acute provider will find themselves part of a very different non-hospital based business model. 
Most of the integrated pathways that will be created will seek to move some existing healthcare 
away from the hospitals and establish it within the community which will create tensions. The 
hospitals may well organise any integration around its own needs and not act as an honest broker (). 
There has been some commentary that depicts the Lead Provider as dangerous to patient care, 
claiming that the loss of direct relationship between commissioner and provider will destabilise 
institutions. There is also the possibility that at the moment the institution bound clinical 
governance of work provides safer quality care that would be lost if they were subcontracting to a 
lead provider (Corrigan & Laitner 2012). 
 
d) Outcome-Based Contracting and Commissioning 
Definition and Purpose: Outcome-based contracting and commissioning (used interchangeably in 
the literature) are designed to: 
“...shift the focus from activities to results, from how a programme operates to the good it 
accomplishes.”  (Plantz et al 1999 p11).  
The purpose is to define the funding to be given not in terms of outputs achieved or processes to be 
followed but what outcomes might be expected. So outcome criteria will include measuring the 
extent to which for example a health condition, or behaviour has improved and the evidence that 
the implementation/intervention processes have achieved this outcome (Kerslake 2006). 
There is very little evidence of effectiveness and the concept is relatively new in the UK, but there is 
a general consensus that commissioning services at the individual service user level on the basis of 
outcomes rather than tasks is a precondition for service change and achieving person-centred care 
for all service users. It involves shifting the power from commissioners to providers in a major way 
and empowering them to be responsive and flexible in the light of service users’ shifting needs and 



































outcome it must be driven by the service user’s own expression and aspiration, and not something 
imposed upon them (Paley and Slasberg 2007). 
Characteristics: Outcome-based contracting and commissioning has become popular in the USA and 
it underpins Accountable Care Organisations and Value-Based Health Care. It is also often referred to 
as ‘performance-based’ contracting focusing on results rather than activities, defining clear 
performance expectations and measures, providing incentives and monitoring performance (DeMaio 
et al 2002).  
Kerslake (2006) identifies components for a transferable UK framework for implementing outcome-
based commissioning and contracting. The aim is to produce outcomes that are desired, achievable 
and measurable but at the same time are sufficiently testing to offer real incentives and 
achievements to the service providers. He describes the importance of agreeing the parameters 
within which a contract will be framed, assessing provider experience and past record in producing 
outcomes; developing an action plan, and commissioner testing of the response to tender such as 
assessing risk.  
Commissioning for Outcomes-Based Incentivised Contracts (COBICs) (Corrigan and Hicks 2012) is an 
approach developed at the Nuffield and first used in 2011 in Milton Keynes, focusing on integrated 
care. It has been influenced by Porter’s (2012) work on value-based healthcare, notably that value 
and outcomes improve when services and service lines are organised around patient and patient 
pathways, rather than around provider interests. Key points about the COBIC contract include 
introducing incentives into the market in new and innovative ways and using contractual forms that 
are new to the NHS, a single integrated tender with a single organisation that has the responsibility 
for integrating services. The only way a range of different providers can respond with an integrated 
pathway is by developing a partnership with each other. The contract also moves the focus away 
from inputs to outcomes and this is a radical shift for the NHS. Payment for outcomes forces health 
care providers to work outside of their particular part of the pathway and to think of how the whole 
outcome is achieved. Proponents of COBICs advocate the Accountable Lead Provider model as the 
best fit within which to operationalise the approach. 
In general COBICs will require a monumental change. Commissioners need to recognise that they are 
creating a new market in outcome based health care and will need to enter into much more 
discussion with existing and new providers. A competitive dialogue process for example may help 
commissioners to work with providers in developing outcomes that can be delivered and measured. 
Applications: Corrigan and Hicks (2012) report that COBICs are being generated across the country, 
including the example below, but as yet there are none fully operational. From February 2014, NHS 
England unveiled a set of procurement rules that required commissioning support service providers 
to offer commissioners help with drawing up innovative outcomes based contracts (Williams 2014) 
which has provided an imperative to developing this contracting approach. 
Oxfordshire commissioners are one of several (Northumberland, Cambridge, London and Surrey) 
who have developed COBICs. Oxfordshire’s focus on maternity, adult mental health and frail older 
people’s services (HSJ Local Briefing May 2013). Outcomes for the latter have a set on staying 



































experience of care and their ability to live independently after treatment with the aim of keeping 
people with long-term conditions stable, and returning the patient back to a normal, stable 
condition as quickly as possible after a crisis. It is hoped this will incentivise efficient working, and 
will represent a shift away from simply paying providers more if activity levels rise, without a full 
transfer of financial risk to the provider that a simple block contract approach could bring about. 
However, it is also the case that outcome based commissioning is not an answer to more immediate 
issues such as the financial squeeze and pressures on the acute sector. In addition rolling out COBICs 
has not been without more significant challenges, as will be described below. 
Benefits/Success Factors: There is no evidence of effectiveness but there are some suggested 
success factors in defining outcomes with providers. Kerslake (2006) for example emphasises the 
importance of describing the rationale for the outcomes, allowing sufficient time for outcomes to be 
tested through stakeholder involvement, and linking them to business plans, organisational goals 
and any inter-agency strategy. Other success factors include time and thought, training, support and 
realistic timescales. 
Use of Incentives: COBICs have been generated in Milton Keynes for the substance misuse service 
retendering that combine capitation and rewards for improved outcomes. Money for services was 
reduced but providers were allowed to keep the money generated by not delivering unnecessary 
care (Corrigan & Hicks 2012). The effectiveness of such an approach long term is yet to be 
established. 
 
Critique: With outcomes-based commissioning in general, Kerslake (2006) again highlights a few 
challenges that may be encountered from a UK perspective. For example he states that there are 
few practical examples of UK outcome based contracting on which to draw, and the suspicion is that 
this may be more difficult to deliver than to describe. In addition, getting sound measures can be 
difficult. For example, changing behaviour across a whole local authority area may be hard to 
attribute to the activities of any one project. In such a situation it is easy to fall back on measures of 
process or activity, such as how many people have been seen. Agreeing ‘hard’ measures where there 
is already existing data may be easy, what may prove more difficult is developing good measures of 
‘soft’ or more subjective data. This can be not only much more difficult, but also more expensive if 
accuracy and reliability are to be achieved. Some providers may have previously defined their 
success in terms of the quality of the service they have offered and may have received widespread 
support. A change of approach and the need to provide additional justifications for their work may 
not always be welcome to an organisation and its supporters.  
Further to Kerslake’s reflections, Bovaird & Davies (2011) undertook an analysis of outcome-based 
commissioning and delivery in the public sector in the UK, asking the question of whether it made a 
difference. Many of their conclusions echo Kerslake’s. They state that an outcomes-based approach 
has attempted to be incorporated into public services for a number of decades but with limited 
success. This is due to difficulties specifying and measuring outcomes, alongside interpretation of 
the results, as typically many influences other than public policy will have contributed to these 



































different manifestations of outcomes-based commissioning, but concludes that all commissioning 
strategies put forward by the DoH in recent years (eg World Class Commissioning) urgently need 
rigorous evaluation. 
Regarding the COBICs however, their implementation has been testing. Being one of the largest 
commissioning groups, Oxfordshire’s experiences have particularly come under the spotlight, 
reported in the Health Service Journal as a ‘standoff’ between the CCG and its main acute and 
mental health providers as they strive to move away from activity-based contracts (McLellan 2014). 
While initially untroubled by the radical CCG plans, providers detailed their fears in a communication 
warning of dire consequences, which resulted in a stalling of the implementation. Commentators 
cite pre-election sensitivities alongside the delicate nature of current NHS finances, but McLellan 
notes that CCGs are unlikely to be able to proceed without central government backing. 
 
Discussion 
This paper presented the findings of an international literature review of contracting approaches, 
models and designs, and sought to critically analyse their characteristics, applications and suitability 
to the integrated health and social care agenda in England.  
What was clear within all the models was that, when it comes to contracting and commissioning, 
there is a need to change the current state of play to secure a better fit with the requirements of 
integrated care and the transformation agenda. The common focus on leadership, relational aspects 
between sectors such as trust and partnership, and emphasis largely on outcomes-based 
commissioning reveal distinct ambitions for and ‘great expectations’ of these approaches. At a time 
when commissioners are calling loudly for assistance, the supporters of these models marshal their 
arguments well and put their cases forward in a convincing way. However given their relative 
newness, some of the literature about models has been largely dependent upon a narrow range of 
commentators and at present the debates are not broad enough. In addition, for all models, data 
sources for the review had their aetiology embedded within the health arena; this may reflect the 
contracting drive that is being led by CCGs or may be due to the lack of visibility or access to social 
care commentary on this issue. Either way social care is crucial to enrich perspectives and provide 
uniform applicability and must be provided, especially if there is continued interest in developing 
joint outcomes.  
 
Of all the models, the spotlight is increasingly being placed on ACOs, given the influence of this 
model in English policy, predominantly the Five Year Forward View, and with this comes the 
increased focus on incentives and other financial drivers that are firmly embedded within the 
American health system (DeVore & Champion 2011). Writing in 2008, Deloitte & Touche stated that 
there is a body of empirical evidence that individuals, teams and organisations in the public sector, 
do respond to formal incentives and that incentives can promote effort and performance (e.g. 
Lazear, 2000, Prentice et al, 2007). In a review, they cautioned however that although agents will 
often change their behaviour in response to sanction/reward mechanisms, this is not always in 
desired ways. These mechanisms can have consequences quite different from those intended by 



































particular circumstances of an organisation, is crucial in ensuring correct incentives and an effective 
sanction/reward scheme (Deloitte & Touche 2008). Incentive systems are not new to the English 
health care system, with the introduction of Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) in 
2008 where a proportion of a provider’s income is made conditional on achieving a set of 
measurable quality related goals set each year (DoH 2008). But incentives take on a different hue 
when placed within an integrated setting, where there is a need for group accountability for 
outcomes and a focus on ‘risk and reward’ sharing, and alongside this the implementation pathways 
are far from clear.  
In general the suitability of ACO transfer to the English health and social care context, alongside 
other models, needs further assessment. While historically some ‘implants’ have created new health 
movements, such as the American evidence-based practice agenda introduced by New Labour in 
health and education (Hulme 2006), adoption of international initiatives is often viewed with 
scepticism and not helped by the political tendency of rolling them out before testing (Billings 2013).  
Paradoxically, while the evidence-based agenda has been embraced, a striking feature of the models 
as implied above is any firm indication that they actually work. While some authors are hopeful and 
can point to positive evaluation of similar schemes (eg Song et al 2012 for ACOs), there is significant 
critical commentary that they may not work and some soft evidence that they do not. For example, 
the relational aspects connected to risk and reward sharing particularly in Alliance models are 
frequently seen to break down in the industrial context more often than not, where parties ‘revert 
to type’ due to pressures of competition. Whether or not this may be a concern in the health and 
social care setting remains to be seen. 
Yet despite this lack of evidence, the models appear to make significant claims about what they can 
achieve; these include the universal imperatives of fewer preventable A&E visits, hospital 
admissions, and readmissions; major efficiency improvements; gains in productivity; and 
transformation of services. It is clear that contracting models are central to any change, but 
attributing these ambitions to integrated care contracting processes is complex and testing, and may 
be too remote from the reality of what integrated care can achieve. This is being explored through 
recent publications such as Mason et al’s (2015), where the authors provided an evidence review of 
the reported effects of 38 integrated financing (key to most of the models) and integrated care 
schemes and found that no scheme achieved a sustained reduction in hospital use, nor did they 
significantly improve health or reduce costs. So it is evident that there needs to be a clearer 
connection between the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ when it comes to what the contracting models 
can achieve. As Addicott (2014) notes the contractual frameworks themselves do not automatically 
stimulate greater integration of services or explicitly hold the contract-holder to account for 
improving outcomes. It is also interesting that there are more ambitions for service outcomes than 
there are for the citizen in receipt of services, where reference to aspects such as increased positive 
experience and quality of life is often given as an afterthought.  
Some reflections on leadership conclude the discussion. The complexities surrounding the changes 
processes required to implement a new contracting system require optimal leadership, arguably 
pivotal to their success or failure. Yet difficulties with selecting who is most suitable emerge within 



































‘Lead Provider’ was used in different ways in the examples cited – accountable prime provider, 
prime contractor, and active integrator - and while Addicott (2014) elaborates on this, it is not 
entirely clear what the differences are. Regarding leadership of this model in particular, Corrigan 
(2013) gives examples including GP federations, but the constantly moving backdrop of NHS reform 
continues to make it hard to predict with any degree of certainty who should take this role. Hawkes 
(2014) for example remarks on the ambiguity surrounding federations and reports the challenges of 
forming them with respect to size, geography, legalities and how to measure success. So the chances 




Although the literature review has illuminated upon the main contracting models under current 
debate, there still remain a number of uncertainties regarding their applicability and utility for the 
health and social care agenda, particularly when aspiring to a whole systems approach. What 
appears to be happening in practice however as identified within a number of descriptive case 
studies is an organic development. With the growing number of examples emerging in health and 
social care, there is hope that these may act as ‘trailblazers’ and support further development. 
 
But instead of looking at individual models and assessing their transferable worth, there may be a 
place for examining principles that underpin the models to reshape current contracting processes. 
This is a view supported by Addicott (2014), who suggests that a number of ambitions can be built 
into the terms of a contract in order to elicit collaboration and quality improvement, while retaining 
patient choice. In addition to this, such an approach would enable contracting to be more tailored to 
the aspirations of local commissioners and providers and create a model that moves away from a 
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Literature Review: Approach and Search Strategy 
The approach taken to the literature review was narrative or traditional, the purpose of which is to 
critique and summarise a body of literature and draw conclusions about the topic in question, in 
order to provide the reader with a comprehensive background for understanding current knowledge 
(Cronin et al 2008). This review was undertaken at time when there was considerable discussion and 
opinion about contracting models (which is continuing), and a narrative approach enables the 
inclusion of looser commentary, and descriptive case studies found more in grey literature.  Most 
guidance recommends a step-by-step approach which was followed as below:   
Step 1: Definition of search keywords. Search terms included  integrated care, health care, social 
care, contracts, commissioning,  collaboration, partnering, partnership, alliance, lead provider, 
accountable care organisations, outcomes, systems approach, incentives. 
 
Step 2. Identification of relevant scientific databases and search engines. Table 1 below indicates 
key scientific and grey literature databases, the latter was important to identify news items. In 
addition to these, Academic Search Complete (University accessed) was used to identify contracting 
models outside of health and social care, within different industries and legal settings. This particular 
database is multidisciplinary and hosts over 13,000 indexed and abstracted journals.  
 







Science Direct http:/www.sciencedirect.com 
Google Scholar http://google.co.uk/; http://scholar.google.co.uk/ 
Directory of Open Access Journals http://doaj.org/ 
International Society for Third Sector 
Research 
http://www.istr.org/ 
Journal of Innovation & 
Entrepreneurship 
http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/ 
Health evidence http://www.healthevidence.org/ 
Centre for European Policy Studies 




Google For online and published commentary and articles (eg Health Service 
Journal)  http://google.co.uk/ 
OpenGrey System for Information on Grey Literature in Europe, open access to 
700,000 bibliographical references. www.opengrey.eu/  
Health Management 
Information Consortia 





































Step 3. Database Search. Using the above, 1048 international references, abstracts and other items 
were obtained and scanned for relevance according to the aims of the literature review.  
 
Step 4. Refinement of search results. Due to the need to collate a wide range of information about 
existing and emerging models from multi-disciplinary sources within and outside of health and social 
care, the inclusion and exclusion criteria remained broad. From the initial hit it was clear that 
refinement needed to consider examples that had been applied in practice and those that had not, 
as well as current thinking and debates surrounding contracting models, and theoretical approaches. 
In addition, some models had a long history so the search time span was 1980 to present to 
accommodate this. Similarly, although a key feature of the project was to identify evidence of what 
works, it quickly became clear that many models were scientifically unevaluated. Grey literature 
became an important source of information about how models were being taken forward. 
Refinement resulted in the identification of the following eight models with numbers of articles in 
paranthesis: Accountable Care Organisations (15), Alliance Contracting Model (16); Lead 
Provider/Prime Contractor Model (11); Outcomes-Based Commissioning and Contracting (22) 
Partnering Model (13); Value-Based Healthcare (11); Incomplete Contracting (6); and the Alzira 
Model (4). As incentives were identified as being purported to be central to the success of 
contracting models, addition literature specific to this topic was gathered (6).  
 
Step 5. Evaluation and synthesis of relevant findings. A number of selected publications following 
refinement were examined to isolate key relevant themes under which the information could be 
categorised. These broad themes were eventually developed: 
Definition and Purpose (the key functions and aims of the model);  
Characteristics  (a description of component parts); 
Application (examples in practice and any application to the NHS and Social Care)  
Benefits/Success Factors (evidence of effectiveness if available, anecdotal benefits, ambitions, ‘how 
to’ indicators);  
Critique (critical discussion of the models highlighting challenges); 
Use of incentives (how staff, services and/or organisations are incentivised to work together to 








Websites of NGOs affiliated with the UN Economic and Social Council 
and The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations. 
https://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=012681683249965267634:q4g1
6p05-ao 
Eldis Contains over 26,000 summarized documents from approximately 7,500 
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